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ABSTRACT
Using data from the high-stakes 2013 Dubai professional tennis tournament, we find that,
compared with a tied score, (i) male players have a higher serve speed and thus exhibit more
effort when behind in score, and their serve speeds get less sensitive to losses or gains when
score difference gets too large, and (ii) female players do not change their serve speed when
behind, while serving slower when ahead. Thus, male players comply more with Prospect Theory
exhibiting more loss aversion and reflection effect. Our results are robust to controlling for player







With their famous Prospect Theory, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) postulated that economic agents
make decisions with respect to a salient reference
point and are impacted by losses more than gains –
‘loss aversion’. In addition, they are risk seeking in
losses and risk averse in gains – the ‘reflection effect’.
In this article, we will examine the performance of
very experienced professional male and female ten-
nis players to test for loss aversion and reflection
effect in a very competitive high-stakes context.
A large empirical literature suggests that loss aver-
sion exists (e.g. Thaler et al. 1997; Genesove and
Mayer 2001; among others). While there is hardly
any stand-alone literature on the reflection effect,
some important papers on risk-taking behaviour in
tournament settings provide some support for that
effect nevertheless. Bronars (1986), for instance,
finds that leading players in sequential tournaments
prefer a low-risk strategy to ‘lock in’ in their gains,
whereas lesser players choose a riskier strategy.
Moreover, Nieken and Sliwka (2010) find that risk-
taking behaviour crucially depends on the correla-
tion between the outcomes of a risky strategy as well
as on the size of the potential lead of one of the
participants. In spite of the extent of the literature
documenting behavioural biases such as loss aver-
sion and reflection effect, however, many scholars –
including some who have documented behavioural
biases in some domains earlier – remain sceptical of
the claim that biases persist in markets (e.g. List
2003; Levitt and List 2008; Hart 2005). Critics of
the decision bias literature believe that biases are
likely to be extinguished by competition, large stakes
and experience.
In this article, we first use a theoretical model
motivated by the Prospect Theory of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979). Using simple Tullock contest-
success functions, we find that (i) a server will put
more effort into his/her serve speed when behind in
score than when ahead in score, (ii) a server will put
less effort into his/her serve speed when significantly
behind in score than when slightly behind in score
and, likewise, when significantly ahead in score than
slightly ahead in score and finally (iii) overall servers
will be more risk averse in the domain of gains than
in the domain of losses. Then we test the predictions
of this simple theoretical model using novel data
from the Dubai Duty Free Tennis Championships
in 2013. The data on serve speed was obtained from
Hawk-Eye Innovations, which uses a ball-tracking
technology to measure serve speed.
Our research approach is similar to that of Pope
and Schweitzer (2011), who use the performance of
professional male golf players to test for loss aver-
sion in a high-stakes context. The authors analyse
putts, that is, the final shots players take to complete
a hole. They compare the putts golfers attempted to
a ‘reference point’, that is, to par which is the typical
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number of shots golfers take to complete a hole. In
other words, they compare the shots attempted for
scores other than par to par. The authors find that
this reference point of par heavily influences male
golfers: when the players are ‘under par’, that is,
players are in the gain domain, they are significantly
less accurate than when they attempt otherwise simi-
lar putts for par or when they are ‘over par’. This
shows that male players are loss averse – they invest
more focus when putting for par compared with
under par to avoid encoding a loss.
In this article, we extend Pope and Schweitzer’s
paper. More than applying it to tennis data, we con-
tribute to the literature in four different ways. First,
we have sufficiently large data for both males and
females, and hence we can investigate gender differ-
ences in loss aversion. Second, the special nature of
tennis allows us to investigate the ‘timing’ of loss
aversion since we can examine behavioural responses
to differences in point score, game score and set
score. Third, our data on serve speed is a very accu-
rate measure of effort and, therefore, of loss aversion,
as the use of Hawk-Eye Technology enables us to
obtain precise measures of serve speed. Finally,
while accuracy of putts only measures an outcome,
serve speed measures the player’s input intensity espe-
cially given the fact that the serve is the only shot in
tennis over which a player has full control.
Consequently, our article is conducive to make an
important contribution to this literature by docu-
menting loss aversion as well as reflection effect in
a very competitive field setting, with large stakes,
with very experienced male and female professional
agents. In addition, in a sense, our results can also
serve as a strong robustness check of those of Pope
and Schweitzer that are specific to golf, since tennis
and golf are very different in their competitive nat-
ure. In golf one competes against the whole field
(‘open play’), while in tennis one competes against
only one opponent/team at a time (‘match play’).1
However, we are not the first ones to apply loss
aversion to tennis. A recent paper by Mallard
(2016) studies loss aversion and decision fatigue at
the Wimbledon tennis championship
The first step in our analysis what would consti-
tute the natural and well-defined ‘reference point’ in
tennis – as the counterpart of ‘par’ in golf. It is the
‘tied score’. In tennis, players are ‘at par’ if the game
score is tied in a game (e.g. 0–0, 15–15, 30–30,
40–40, i.e. deuce) or in a set score (e.g. 1–1, 6–6)
or after an equal number of sets, for example, 1–1
(and 2–2 if it is a grand slam tournament); players
are not at par otherwise, that is, a server is behind in
his serving game (e.g. 30–40) or in games in a set
after even numbers of games (e.g. 2–4, 1–5, etc.) or
in sets (e.g. 0–1 or 0–2 and 1–2 if it is a Grand Slam
tournament).
In our empirical analysis, we find that male
players have a higher serve speed and thus exhibit
more effort when behind in score than when ahead
in score compared with when the score is even.
Specifically, we find that being behind in set score
increases male players’ serve speed – and thus effort
– in the order of 1.64 mph or one-tenth of a stan-
dard deviation. Thus, male players exhibit a more
risk seeking behaviour in the loss domain as they
increase their serve speed much more when behind
than they decrease their serve speed when ahead
(loss aversion). In addition, falling far behind in
the game score lowers male players’ serve speed –
and thus effort – and so does pulling far ahead in the
game score as well; thus, their serve speeds get less
sensitive to losses or gains when score difference gets
too large (reflection effect), albeit this latter relation-
ship is not fully symmetric since a player serves
harder when he is behind than when he is ahead,
which too supports loss aversion. These are fully in
line with our theoretical results and as predicted by
Prospect Theory overall (Kahneman and Tversky
1979).
A female player, on the other hand, does not
change her serve speed and thus her effort when
behind compared with when the score is tied, while
she serves slower when ahead than when the score is
tied. Specifically, being ahead in set score decreases
female players’ serve speed – and thus effort – in the
order of 2.65 mph or one-fifth of a standard devia-
tion. Thus, we find that female players are less risk
seeking in the gain domain as they decrease their
serve speed much more when behind than they
increase their serve speed when ahead. Further, fall-
ing far behind in the point score lowers serve speed
1Open play versus match play can account for different features in these sports. For instance, Laband (1990) compared golf and tennis and showed, among
others, that the open play nature of golf tournaments leads to a lack of dominance by one or a few players, whereas in contrast the match play nature of
tennis tournaments is conducive to dominance by one or a few players.
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for females and so does pulling far ahead in the
point score as well. These results too are in line
with our theoretical results and thus by Prospect
Theory, albeit in a somewhat different way than
those of male players and in a less significant way
as well.
Our results are robust to controlling for player
fixed effects as well as player characteristics in a
player random-effects specification. While we find
significant evidence consistent with loss aversion
theory for both male and female players in this
high-stakes tournament setting, we also find signifi-
cant differences in the way loss aversion manifests
itself across genders in that male players exhibit
behaviour more consistent with loss aversion than
do female players.
The article is structured as follows. Section II
provides background for our article, reviewing rele-
vant literature and tennis scoring rules. Section III
presents our theoretical model and provides testable
implications. Section IV presents data followed by
empirical framework. Section V presents and dis-
cusses the results. Section VI concludes.
II. A brief literature review
As alluded to before, in Prospect Theory,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed a refer-
ence-dependent theory of choice in which eco-
nomic agents value gains differently than they
value losses in two key ways. First, economic
agents value losses more than they value commen-
surate gains; that is, the ‘value function’ is kinked
at the reference point with a steeper gradient for
losses than for gains (loss aversion). Second, eco-
nomic agents are risk seeking in losses and risk
averse in gains; that is, the utility function is con-
vex in the loss domain and concave in the gain
domain (the ‘reflection effect’). Loss aversion has
been documented in many laboratory settings (e.g.
Thaler et al. 1997; Gneezy and Potters 1997) and in
several field settings (see Genesove and Mayer
2001; Camerer et al. 1997; Fehr, Goette, and
Zehnder 2007; Odean 1998; Mas 2006), though
some scholars have found evidence to suggest
that experience and large stakes may eliminate
decision errors (List 2003, 2004).
Gill and Stone (2010) have theoretically analysed
loss aversion in a tournament-type setting and
argued that a loss averse subject is disappointed if
she provides effort but does not win the prize. The
model of Gill and Stone (2010) combines reference-
dependent preferences as in the Prospect Theory of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the endogeneity
of agents’ reference points as in the theory of refer-
ence-dependent preferences (K˝oszegi and Rabin
2006). The loss-averse person may either provide
no effort to minimize his disappointment or invest
a very high effort in order to reduce the probability
of losing. Gill and Stone (2010) therefore provide a
testable explanation for the substantial variance in
effort provision observed in tournament settings.
Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) test this explanation
in a laboratory setting and find evidence that loss
aversion affects behaviour in tournaments by show-
ing that elimination of losses relative to expectations
decreases the variance of effort.
Empirical evidence on gender differences in loss
aversion yields mixed results. In experimental stu-
dies, Rau (2014) finds that females are more loss
averse than males in investment decisions while
G¨achter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007) do not
find any gender differences in loss aversion when
subjects are confronted with various gambles. Wang,
Rieger, and Hens (2013) find that men are in general
less risk averse in gains and less risk seeking in losses
than women but the difference is rather small. Most
studies find that females are more risk averse in
gains (Agnew et al. 2008; Borghans et al. 2009;
Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer 1999; Croson and
Gneezy 2009; Dohmen et al. 2011; Von Gaudecker,
Van Soest, and Wengström 2011; Hartog, Ferrer-i
Carbonell, and Jonker 2002; Schubert et al. 1999).
Results are mixed on whether females are more
risk seeking in losses, however. Some studies find
that females are more risk seeking in losses
(Schubert et al. 1999; Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro, and
Schubert 2006), while others find that females are
more risk averse in losses (Levin, Snyder, and
Chapman 1988). On the other hand, Booij, Van
Praag, and Van De Kuilen (2010) and Fehr-Duda,
De Gennaro, and Schubert (2006) find no gender
difference in utility curvature in gains and losses,
suggesting the observed differences in risk attitudes
may be driven by loss aversion (Booij, Van Praag,
and Van De Kuilen 2010; Brooks and Zank 2005;
Schmidt and Traub 2002) or probability weighting
(Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro, and Schubert 2006).
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Therefore, the gender differences of risk attitude in
losses are generally less conclusive, and further
investigation is needed to test to what extent such
results can be generalized (see Croson and Gneezy
2009; Eckel and Grossman 2008; for summaries of
gender difference of risk preference in gains and
losses).
Finally, noting that at important points of a pro-
fessional tennis match both genders use a more
conservative (i.e. less aggressive) playing strategy in
that the odds of both hitting winners and making
unforced errors decrease, Paserman (2010) points to
a different gender difference: the probability of mak-
ing an unforced error relative to hitting a winner
falls for women, while it remains constant for men.
Paserman dismisses gender differences on risk atti-
tudes as an explanation of this finding, and instead
argues (via a simple game-theoretic model) that a
shift from a more aggressive to a less aggressive
strategy can optimally arise as a response to a change
in the intrinsic probabilities of hitting winners or
making unforced errors. In other words, if players
already know their intrinsic tendencies that at more
important points they are more likely to make
unforced errors and less likely to hit winners when
playing aggressively, they will be able to foresee that
and thus choose to revert to a safer playing strategy.
III. A brief overview of tennis rules
According to the International Tennis Federation
(ITF), a standard game is scored as follows with
the server’s score being called first: ‘0’, ‘ 15’, ‘30’,
‘40’, ‘game’, except if each player/team has won three
points, the score is ‘deuce’.2After ‘deuce’, the score is
‘advantage’ for the player/doubles team who wins
the next point. If that same player/team also wins
the next point, that player/team wins the ‘game’; if
the opposing player/team wins the next point, the
score is again ‘deuce’. A player/team needs to win
two consecutive points immediately after ‘deuce’ to
win the ‘game’. One must win six games to win a set.
However, if both players/teams win five games, a
player/team needs to win two consecutive games
immediately after the 5–5 score or if both players/
teams win six games, the winner of the set is deter-
mined by a ‘tie-break’. During a tie-break game,
points are scored ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, etc. The first
player/team to win 7 points wins the ‘tie-break’
and thus the ‘set’, provided that there is a margin
of two points over the opponent player/team; thus, if
necessary, the tie break shall continue until this
margin is achieved. Similarly, one must win two –
or three in Grand Slams – sets to win a match. As
the Dubai tournament is not a Grand Slam tourna-
ment, a player who wins two sets wins the match.
Of particular interest to our analysis, each player
has two chances to initiate a point, or to ‘serve’. The
first serve is usually faster with also a lot of pace and/
or spin. If the server misses this first serve – be it
that it goes out or hits the net – then he/she has
another chance to serve, which is the second serve.
Players generally serve slower during the second
serve, since, if a player misses both serves, it is called
a double fault, which means their opponent auto-
matically wins the point.
IV. Theoretical framework
Here, we develop a simple Theoretical Framework to
examine the influence that loss aversion may have
on first- and second-serve speeds when players are
ahead or behind in score. (As explained before,
similar to golf, there is a well-defined reference
point in tennis, which is represented by a tied score.)
Since in tennis one competes against only one
opponent/team at a time (‘match play’), our model
will have to incorporate the head-to-head contest
feature of tennis. Unlike in golf where a player has
full control over every shot, the only shot in tennis
over which a player has full control is the serve,
which also happens to be the most important shot
(often claimed to be determining the outcome espe-
cially in men’s tennis). Therefore, the biggest effort
would go into the serve especially in terms of the
speed of the serve; this also means more risk taking.
The returner’s effort, too, is important since he/she
has to react as quickly as possible to a faster serve
with a significant physical and cognitive effort as a
point cannot continue without a return that is placed
back into the server’s court. Thus, there is a hierar-
chy of effort levels such that for the server the most
important effort is in the serve and for the returner
the most important effort is in the return.
2http://www.itftennis.com/officiating/rulebooks/rules-of-tennis.aspx
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We first consider the probability of winning a
point as a function of server’s serve effectiveness,
which in turn will be a function of effort of the
server. Let gsðesÞ be the serve effectiveness of the
server and es represents the amount of effort exerted
by the server. As mentioned above, let the probabil-
ity of winning a point be a function of server’s serve
effectiveness, which in turn is a function of effort of
the server:
Prsðwin the point while servingÞ





where es represents the amount of effort exerted by
the server on the serve, er represents the amount of
effort exerted by the returner and ε is random noise.
α and β are such that 1 > α, β > 0 and they depend
on who the server is as well as on zs and, zr which
represent vectors of player characteristics (e.g. rank-
ing, height, weight).
This functional form is the well-known standard
Tullock (1980) contest-success function, which indi-
cates that winning is a probabilistic event but
depends on the relative efforts of contestants cru-
cially. Observe that, since 1 > α > 0 >, f
0
s with
respect to es is positive and f
00
s with respect to es
negative; that is, additional effort strictly increases
the probability of winning a point and that fsðÞ is
strictly concave in effort.
Note that the level of effort and of risk taking
determines the speed of each serve. To incorporate
loss aversion, we utilize the value functions for a
winning score (w), a losing score (l) and a tied
score (t) such that
VðwÞ ¼ 1;VðlÞ ¼ λ and VðtÞ ¼ 0; (2)
where, as in Pope and Schweitzer (2011), too,
λ > 1 denotes the degree of the player’s loss aver-
sion. This implies that the difference in value
between winning a service game and a tied score is
smaller than the difference in value between a tied
score and losing a point. As such, this value function
is a simplified version of the value function implied
by Prospect Theory, that is, without diminishing
sensitivity in gains or losses of the reflection effect
(we will consider the reflection effect after Result 1).
There is a cost of effort for the server, csðesÞ which
strictly increases in effort es with c
0
s with respect to es
is positive and cs00 with respect to es is positive as
well; that is, additional effort strictly increases the
cost of effort and that csðÞ is strictly convex in effort.
Each server’s utility is equal to the values placed
on winning and losing a point weighted by their
probabilities and subtracting the cost of effort. For
our purposes of establishing the impact of loss aver-
sion, we only need to compare payoffs of servers
when they are ahead or behind. In particular, a
serving player derives the following expected utility
when he/she has an advantageous score (e.g. 40–30)
while serving for the game (or set or match); that is,
when it is a game (or set or match) point favouring
















Likewise, a serving player derives the following
expected utility when he/she has a disadvantageous
score (e.g. 30–40) while serving for the game (or set
or match); that is, when it is a game (or set or

















ðλÞ  csðesÞ: (3b)
Maximizing the utility functions in Equation (3a)
and (3b) yields the following first-order conditions
(which, interestingly – and despite using a contest-
success function which was not needed and thus
not used in Pope and Schweitzer (2011) – turn out
to be identical to those of Pope and Schweitzer
(2011)):
3One can similarly come up with value functions for other scores (e.g. 15–0, 0–15, 15–15, 30–15, 15–30 and 30–30), which would need to involve the
probabilities of a winning game given that score ceteris paribus. The analysis that uses only Us (W) at 40–30 and Us (L) at 30–40 will suffice for our
purposes for now. Nevertheless, our more general analysis following Result 1 (which will involve the reflection effect) will need payoff levels at all scores.










¼ λ when the state is L:
(4)
These first-order conditions indicate that a server
chooses an optimal level of effort, es , by setting the
marginal cost of effort equal to the marginal benefit
of effort when serving. When behind in score, the
server chooses a higher optimal effort level, which
equates the ratio of the marginal cost and benefit of
effort to λ, than when ahead, which equates the ratio
of the marginal cost and benefit of effort to 1. Thus,
the first-order conditions imply that a server chooses
a higher effort level in the loss domain than he/she
does in the gain domain. We then obtain the follow-
ing result.
RESULT 1: Controlling for individual characteristics,
and zs and zr leading to α and β, a server will put
more effort into his/her serve speed when behind in
score than when ahead in score.
In (2), we considered simplified, linear value func-
tions that contained a loss aversion parameter, λ,
only. Let Ts denote the score of the server (in terms
of points or games or sets) and Tr denote the score of
the returner. Equation (5) below extends value func-
tions to incorporate both a loss aversion parameter, λ,
as before, as well as separate risk preference para-
meters for the gain and loss domains (i.e. to consider
the reflection effect as well): Let VðwÞ ¼ ðTs  TrÞγ
with Ts >Tr, VðlÞ ¼ λðTr  TsÞδ, with Tr > Ts and
VðtÞ ¼ 0, where 1 > δ  γ > 0 are parameters that
allow for ‘diminishing sensitivity’ in score difference
such that incremental gains in ðTs  TrÞ above the
reference point, that is, the tied score, result in pro-
gressively smaller utility improvements and, conver-
sely, incremental reductions in ðTs  TrÞ; which are
below the tied score result in progressively smaller
declines in utility. In addition, also let Δs ¼ ðTs  TrÞ
and  Δr ¼ ðTr  TsÞ; where Δs ¼ Δr ¼ Δ if and
only if Ts  Tr ¼ ðTr  TsÞ.
Then, we will have
ðiÞVðwÞ ¼ ðΔsÞγ; ðiiÞVðlÞ
¼ λðΔsÞδand ðiiiÞVðtÞ ¼ 0: (5)
The curvature of these utility functions induces a
server to exert less effort when he/she is much more
ahead (e.g. 40–0 in his/her serve game or 4–0 in
games) than when he/she is slightly ahead (e.g.
40–30 in his/her serve game or 4–3), and less effort
when he/she is much more behind (e.g. 0–40 in his/
her serve game or 0–4 in games) than he/she when is
slightly behind (e.g. 30–40 in his/her serve game or
3–4 in games).
Maximizing the utility functions in Equation (3a)
and (3b) based on Equation (5) will take risk aver-
sion coefficients into consideration (i.e. the effort
choice for the serve will depend on those coefficients











¼ λðΔsÞδ when the state is L: (7)
Observe that when Δs ¼ Δr ¼ Δ, the first-order
conditions still clearly imply that a server chooses
higher effort level in the loss domain than he/she
does in the gain domain for the same score differ-




s ¼ ðΔsÞγ implies that a server
will put more effort into his/her serve speed when





s ¼ λ  ðΔsÞδ implies a server will put
less effort into his/her serve speed when significantly
behind in score than when slightly behind in score.
Further, note that, with λ > 1 and δ  γ, first-
order conditions also allow that a more loss averse
server with γ and δ will put more effort into his/her
serve in terms of speed at a more disparate losing
score than a less loss averse server with γ0 < γ and
δ0 < δ will at the same or more disparate losing
score.
Thus, we have the following result, which essen-
tially states that players’ effort levels and thus serve
speeds get less sensitive to losses or gains when score
difference gets too large:
RESULT 2: Controlling for individual characteristics,
and zs and zr leading to α and β, a server will put less
effort into his/her serve speed when significantly
behind in score than when slightly behind in score
and, likewise, when significantly ahead in score than
slightly ahead in score.
As a result of both the loss aversion and the reflec-
tion effect (i.e. diminishing sensitivity) components
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of Prospect Theory (i.e. by both λ > 1 and
1 > δ  γ > 0), servers in the domain of gains
will choose a more risk averse serve with a given
score Δ ¼ ðTs  TrÞ > 0 than servers in the domain
of losses facing the opposite score
 Δ ¼ ðTs  TrÞ < 0. This leads to our final result:
RESULT 3: Controlling for individual characteristics,
and zs and zr leading to α and β, a server will be more
risk averse in his/her serve speed when ahead with a
particular score Δ than when behind with the opposite
score  Δ. Thus, overall, servers will be more risk averse
in the domain of gains than in the domain of losses.
V. Data and empirical framework
The data used in our article consists of 32 matches
(19 matches for male and 13 matches for female
players, and as such thousands of first and second
serves by both genders) of the Dubai Duty Free
Tennis Championships in 2013 for which Hawk-
Eye Technology was available. Since its inauguration
in 1993, the tournament has been hosted in the
Dubai Duty Free Tennis Stadium. It is a $2 million
‘Women’s Tennis Association’ (WTA) Premier
Event, and a $2 million ‘Association of Tennis
Players’ (ATP) 500 tournament. The tournament
attracts the best players in the world. In 2013, the
number 1 players in the world, Novak Djokovic
from Serbia and Victoria Azarenka from Belarus
were the top seeds in the tournament for males
and females respectively.4
Our dependent variable, the serve speed, was
obtained from Hawk-Eye Innovations, which uses a
ball tracking technology to measure it. The Hawk-
Eye technology has been used at all ATP, WTA and
ITF tournaments since 2002.5 During the 2013
Dubai Duty Free Tennis Championships, it recorded
all matches played on the centre court. Only serves
that were counted ‘in’ were included in the dataset,
simply because the Hawk-Eye Technology does not
measure the serve speed for serves that are ruled
‘out’. Data was unavailable for two of the female
matches (Putintseva versus. Robson and Stosur ver-
sus Makarova), although the Hawk-Eye technology
was installed for those matches.
The player characteristics, such as age, height,
weight and rank were obtained from ATP and
WTA official sites for male and female players,
respectively. The age is measured in months, the
height is measured in centimetres and the weight
is measured in kilograms. The variable definitions
are presented in Table 1, while summary statistics
for male and female players are presented in
Table 2.
Our Theoretical Framework implies that a server
will be more risk averse in his/her serve speed when
ahead in score than when behind in score. In some
specifications, in addition to set difference, we con-
trol for game difference and point difference to see
whether being ahead or behind in a set or a game
has any effect on serve speed.
We next outline the empirical strategy in our
baseline specification to test our hypotheses. We
estimate the following equation:
Sij ¼ α2D2ijþα3D3ijþα4D4ijþ βηijþ γtijþ δμiþ εij;
Table 1. Variable definitions.
Variable Definition
Serve Speed The serve speed, measured for every serve in the
match, by Hawk-Eye technology, measured in mph
Round The stage of the tournament, 1 being the lowest
possible value (first round of matches), and 6 being
the highest possible value (the final)
Tie-break
dummy
The dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the
serve takes place during a Tie-Break, 0 otherwise
Second serve
dummy
The dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the
serve is ‘second serve’, which implies that the player
made an error during the first serve and this
particular serve is his/her last chance before he/she
is penalized by a point
Rank The ATP or WTA World-Rank of the player, 1 week
prior to the start of the tournament (obtained from
ATP or WTA website)
Age The age of the player, measured in months, 1 week
prior to the start of the tournament (obtained from
ATP or WTA website)
Height The height of the players, measured in centimetres
(obtained from ATP or WTA website)
Weight The weight of the player, measured in kilograms
D1 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the set score is tied at
0,0
D2 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the set score is 0,1
where the serving player is behind
D3 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the set score is 1,0
where the serving player is ahead
D4 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the set score is 1,1
Game
difference
The number of games won by the player currently
serving−the number of games won by the receiver
in the current set, prior to the serve
Point difference The number of points won by the player currently
serving−the number of points won by the receiver
in the current set, prior to the serve
4Victoria Azarenka withdrew with injury, making world number 2 Serena Williams from the United States the top seed.
5For more information, see http://www.hawkeyeinnovations.co.uk/page/sports-officiating/tennis.
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where Sij is the serve speed of player i in serve j.
Since a player has to win two sets to win a match,
there are four possible outcomes during a match that
can be represented as (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1),
where the first number in each bracket indicates a
player’s own score and the second number is his
opponent’s score. Hence, we construct four dummy
variables based on these four possible outcomes.
Dummy variable D1ij is equal to 1 if set score is
(0,0), dummy variable D2ij is equal to 1 if set score
is (0,1), dummy variable D3ij is equal 1 if set score is
(1,0) and dummy variable D4ij is equal to 1 if set
score is (1,1). D1 is the omitted dummy in the
regression.
Dummy variable ηij indicates whether the serve is
the player’s second serve, dummy variable tij indicates
whether the serve is the player’s tie-breaking serve
and μi is a player fixed effect. In alternative specifica-
tions, we include a set of player characteristics such as
age, rank, height and weight of the player and cluster
errors at the player level. εij is the random error term
with mean zero conditional on explanatory variables.
In some specifications, we will control for player
characteristics such as age, rank, height and weight
and model the player effects as random.
VI. Results
Descriptive analysis
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by differences
in sets for male and female players.
Comparing simple averages for males, we fail to
reject that average speed when ahead or behind is
significantly different than average speed when tied
at (0,0) in set score. However, for females, we find
that average speed when behind is significantly higher
than average speed when tied at (0,0) in a t-test.
Furthermore, average speed when ahead is signifi-
cantly lower than average speed when tied at (0,0)
in set score. Hence descriptive statistics for female
players are consistent with loss aversion theory. Of
course, testing the equality of simple averages does
not give us the whole picture. We next turn to regres-
sion analysis to examine the effect of set score and
game score differences on serve speed.
Regression results
MAIN EFFECTS. – Table 3 presents results where we
control for dummy variables for each possible set
score, a second serve dummy variable and a tie-
break dummy variable in a player fixed effect speci-
fication. Columns 1 through 3 present results for
male players and 4 through 6 for female players.
As we explained in the methodology section, there
are four possible set score outcomes during a match
that can be represented as (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1),
where the first number in each bracket indicates the
serving player’s own score and the second number is
his opponent’s score. Hence, we construct four
dummy variables based on these four possible out-
comes. Again, dummy variable D1 is equal to 1 if set
score is (0,0), dummy variable D2 is equal to 1 if set
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by differences in sets.
Male players
Full sample
(number of obs = 2191)
D1 (number of





Variables Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
Serve Speed 105.4 14.3 72 134 105.1 14.5 74 134 106.0 14.1 74 132 104.6 13.8 78 132 106.9 14.8 72 132
Rank 35.3 50.1 1 315 40.3 54.8 1 315 33.9 32.3 2 167 28.6 58.9 1 315 30.6 38.1 2 128
Age 351.6 29.8 308 408 353.9 29.7 308 408 344.6 27.1 308 395 352.5 30.8 308 408 354.8 31.0 308 393
Height 187.7 6.3 178 198 187.4 6.4 178 198 189.2 6.6 178 198 187.0 5.1 178 198 187.4 6.9 178 198
Weight 82.8 7.6 70 97 82.5 7.6 70 97 83.6 8.6 70 97 81.4 6.0 70 97 85.2 7.1 73 97
Female players
Full sample









Variables Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
Serve speed 85.6 12.0 54 114 85.7 11.6 54 114 88.1 11.9 58 114 81.4 11.3 54 110 87.4 12.6 54 114
Rank 18.5 17.7 6 91 19.1 18.7 6 91 23.9 23.9 6 91 15.4 10.1 7 38 13.5 7.3 7 30
Age 322.4 41.1 232 387 323.6 40.1 232 387 319.0 45.9 232 383 325.2 39.7 254 387 319.5 39.2 254 383
Height 170.4 6.2 163 182 170.5 6.4 163 182 171.8 5.8 163 178 167.7 6.1 163 182 171.5 5.5 164 182
Weight 61.8 4.4 55 74 61.7 4.2 55 74 62.7 4.9 57 74 60.4 3.2 55 70 62.9 4.7 59 74
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score is (0,1) and hence the serving player is behind,
dummy variable D3 is equal to 1 if set score is (1,0)
and hence the serving player is ahead and dummy
variable is D4 is equal to 1 if set score is (1,1). D1 is
the omitted dummy variable in the regression.
In column 1, we observe that D2 is positive and
significant implying that a male player serves faster
when behind than when he is tied at (0,0) with his
opponent. This result is consistent with loss aversion
theory: a player is more risk seeking when he is in
the loss domain. Whereas when he is ahead, his
speed is not significantly different from when he is
tied at (0,0). We also observe that serve speed
decreases for the second serve. This clearly indicates
that a player is risk averse and hence reduces serve
speed when losing a point if a double fault is at stake.
We should also emphasize that the set difference is a
solid reference point, and is not affected by which
player served first.
A sense of being behind or ahead can also occur
when a player is behind or ahead in game score
within a given set. Game score difference ranges
from −5 to 5. In column 2, we include game score
difference and game score difference square as
additional controls to examine how players
respond to differences in game score. The coeffi-
cients on set score dummy variables remain mostly
unchanged when variables for game score are
included.
We observe that the coefficient on game score
difference is negative and significant. This suggests
that a male player’s serve speed is faster when behind
than when ahead consistent with loss aversion the-
ory and the results in our Theoretical Framework.
We then check whether players’ serve speeds are
indeed less sensitive to losses or gains when game
score differences get too large in absolute terms.
Hence to control for this effect, we include the
square of game score difference in column 2 in
addition to game score difference. We observe that
both the game-score difference and the squared term
is negative and significant. Hence, while serve speed
is higher when behind than when ahead, falling far
behind in the game score lowers serve speed and so
does pulling far ahead in the game score as well. This
is fully in line with Result 2 in our Theoretical
Framework section. Nevertheless, due to loss aver-
sion, the relationship is not fully symmetric since a
player serves harder when he is behind by, say, z
games than when he is ahead by z games. This
asymmetry is fully in line with Results 1 and 3 in
our Theoretical Framework section. This asymmetric
non-monotonic relationship between game score
difference is shown in Figure 1. The x-axis increases
with game score difference where positive numbers
indicate a server who is ahead in games vis-a-vis the
server’s opponent. The y-axis reports the serve speed
in miles per hour.
Table 3. Benchmark regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males Males Males Females Females Females
D2 1.549*** 1.639*** 1.635*** 0.709 0.675 0.757
(3.01) (3.18) (3.18) (1.27) (1.19) (1.34)
D3 0.681 0.626 0.625 –2.667*** –2.691*** –2.653***
(1.29) (1.19) (1.19) (–4.60) (–4.61) (–4.55)
D4 0.055 –0.262 –0.255 –1.588** –1.525** –1.433**
(0.08) (–0.38) (0.37) (–2.50) (–2.38) (–2.24)
Game diff. – –0.503*** –0.500*** – 0.001 –0.005
(–3.70) (–3.67) (0.01) (–0.04)
Game diff.2 – –0.127*** –0.127*** – 0.042 0.046
(–2.76) (–2.75) (0.88) (0.97)
Point diff. – 0.011 – – –0.167
(0.07) (–1.00)
Point diff 2 – –0.023 – – 0.261***
(–0.26) (2.72)
Tie-break dummy 0.037 –0.160 –0.134 NA NA NA
(0.03) (–0.14) (–0.12)
Second serve dummy –21.598*** –21.641*** –21.642*** –14.584*** –14.586*** –14.593***
(–57.85) (–58.08) (–58.04) (–35.19) (–35.18) (–35.27)
Constant 114.023*** 114.248*** 114.280*** 91.696*** 91.578*** 91.173***
(359.60) (331.99) (311.18) (274.98) (245.42) (234.96)
Player fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat. 627.77*** 486.31*** 377.91*** 311.65*** 207.70*** 157.53***
*Significant at 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
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In column 3 we also control for point score dif-
ference and point score difference square to further
examine when exactly behaviour consistent with loss
aversion kicks in. We do not find variables for point
score to be significant determinants of serve speed.
Hence, we find that being behind in set score
increases male players’ serve speed – and thus effort
– in the order of 1.64 mph or one-tenth of a stan-
dard deviation.
We next consider results for female players.
Column 4 is a fixed effects specification with set
score dummy variables, second serve dummy and
tie-break dummy as controls. This specification esti-
mated for females is identical to the specification in
column 1 that was estimated for males. In this
regression, D2 is insignificant indicating that a
female player does not change her serve speed
when behind compared with when she is tied at
0,0. This result is sharply different from that for
male players. On the other hand, we observe that
D3 is negative and significant compared with the
omitted variable D1 implying that a female player
serves slower when ahead than when she is tied at
0,0 with her opponent. Females are more risk averse
in the gain domain but they are not necessarily more
risk seeking in the loss domain. Nevertheless, this is
still in line with Result 3 in our Theoretical
Framework since, overall, female servers too are
more risk averse in the domain of gains than in the
domain of losses.
It is interesting to note that, female players’ serve
speed is lower when tied at (1,1) compared with
(0,0). It might simply be a conditioning issue or it
might be the case that female players decrease serve
speed when competitive pressure becomes high.
Similar behaviour is observed for female players’
second serves. In column 5, we include game score
difference and game score difference square as addi-
tional controls. We do not find these variables to be
significant for females. Hence, while we find strong
evidence for loss aversion for males, results so far are
somewhat less conclusive for females. In column 6,
we include point score difference and point score
difference square as additional controls. The coeffi-
cient on point score difference is not significant
while the coefficient on point score difference square
is positive and significant. The latter is fully in line
with Result 2 in our Theoretical Framework. Hence,
being ahead in set score decreases female players’
serve speed – and thus effort in the order of 2.65
mph or one-fifth of a standard deviation.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS – We find that male
players are more risk seeking in the loss domain
and female players are more risk averse in the gain
domain. We next consider a number of alternative
explanations that might help explain our results.
Differences in player ability – We control for
player-level fixed effects to control for unobserved
ability of each player. However, in order to examine
whether ability and serve speed are correlated, we
estimate a linear regression, including player char-
acteristics such as age, rank, height and weight and
model player effects as random. Age and rank can be
proxies for experience and ability. In these result
shown in Table 4, we observe that the statistical
significance of coefficients remains similar to the
baseline regressions presented in Table 3. Neither
age nor rank is associated with serve speed.
Nervousness – Psychological factors can influ-
ence performance (Beilock and Carr 2001; Beilock
et al. 2004). Dubai Tennis Tournament is a high-
stakes competition with large financial conse-
quences, and prior work has found that people
often feel nervous or anxious when they face high
stakes (McCarthy and Goffin 2004; Beilock 2008;
Ariely et al. 2009). Feelings of nervousness can
harm performance by disrupting task-focused think-
ing (Sarason 1984) and by motivating people to
make expedient choices to exit their current situa-
tion (Brooks and Schweitzer 2011). To account for
this possibility, we include the player’s rank on the
professional tennis tour as proxy. Our results, shown
in 3, are essentially the same as in our baseline-fixed
Figure 1. Example of a parametric plot.
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effects specification. Arguably, more experienced
players may suffer from less nervousness than less
experienced ones. We control for rank as well as age,
which is a proxy for experience, in order to test for
this possibility and find that rank and age are not
significant determinants of serve speed.
Köszegi-Rabin reference points – In our concep-
tual framework and in our analyses, we have
assumed that players make reference-dependent
choices adopting in score (par) as their point of
reference. In recent theoretical work, K˝oszegi and
Rabin (2006) suggest that rational expectations
might serve as the point of reference for reference-
dependent choices. Farber (2008) allows reference
points to be different across people but treats the
income reference points as latent variables (as
opposed to assigning reference points based on
rational expectations). Professional tennis players
may develop expectations for their performance
that are different from ‘par’, that is, from the ‘tied
score’. For example, average game score in a set or
average set score in a match for each player may be
the unique reference point for that player. In order
to test for this possibility, we have tried a number of
different reference points, like the number of points
or the number of games won in a match, all of which
were insignificant.6
Heterogeneity in loss aversion – We next con-
sider heterogeneity across players. We consider indi-
vidual differences, and we explore the possibility that
the most experienced players exhibit less loss aver-
sion than less experienced players. We established
that a player serves slower when ahead than when
behind in set score. That is, due to loss aversion a
player serves faster when behind than when ahead.
In order to test how experience plays out in this
relationship between serve speed and set score, we
include an interaction term of rank with set
Table 4. Controlling for player characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males Males Males Females Females Females
D2 1.503*** 1.581*** 1.575*** 0.739 0.706 0.790
(2.94) (3.89) (3.08) (1.32) (1.25) (1.40)
D3 0.707 0.671 0.672 –2.641*** –2.660*** –2.620***
(1.35) (1.29) (1.29) (–4.57) (–4.56) (–4.56)
D4 0.137 –0.163 –0.147 –1.498** –1.427** –1.330**
(0.20) (–0.24) (–0.22) (–2.37) (–2.23) (–2.08)
Game diff. – –0.486*** –0.484*** – 0.005 –0.001
(–3.62) (–3.59) (0.04) (–0.01)
Game diff.2 – –0.127*** –0.127*** – 0.040 0.044
(–2.78) (–2.76) (0.85) (0.94)
Point diff. – – 0.023 – – –0.168
(0.14) (–1.00)
Point diff.2 – – –0.024 – – 0.264***
(–0.27) (2.75)




–21.598*** –21.641*** –21.643*** –14.567*** –14.567*** –14.573***
(–57.91) (–58.56) (–58.12) (–35.15) (–35.13) (–35.22)
Rank –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.043 0.045 0.046
(–0.03) (–0.01) (–0.00) (0.49) (0.53) (0.56)
Age 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.83) (0.78) (0.80) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Height 0.354* 0.353* 0.352* 0.275 0.276 0.281
(1.92) (1.78) (1.83) (0.91) (0.95) (0.99)
Weight 0.274* 0.269 0.269 0.681* 0.678 0.676**
(1.73) (1.58) (1.62) (1.94) (2.02) (2.07)
Constant 16.679 17.480 17.528 2.154 1.968 0.619
(0.51) (0.50) (0.52) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01)
Player fixed effects No No No No No No
Wald-Stat. 3389.89*** 3436.93*** 3434.27*** NA NA NA
R-square 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.47 0.47 0.48
Number of obs. 2191 2191 2191 1312 1312 1312












*Significant at 10% level, **significant at the 5% level and ***significant at the 1% level.
6These results are available upon request.
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difference in our baseline specification. If experi-
enced players are less prone to loss aversion, we
expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be
positive and significant meaning that experience
decreases the effect of set score difference on serve
speed. In other words, an experienced player is less
risk averse (less risk seeking) in the gain domain
(loss domain) than an inexperienced player. The
inclusion of the aforementioned interaction term,
however, did not yield any significant results.7
Risk behaviour in tournaments – Looking at risk
taking in tournaments, as alluded to before, Bronars
(1986) finds that leading players in sequential tour-
naments prefer a low-risk strategy to a ‘lock in’ in
their gains, whereas their opponents choose a riskier
strategy and Nieken and Sliwka (2010) find that risk-
taking behaviour crucially depends on the correla-
tion between the outcomes of the risky strategy as
well as on the size of a potential lead of one of the
participants. This strategy, described in Bronars
(1986), is indeed analogous to the reflection effect,
and the implications of his model appear fully con-
sistent with our results.
VII. Conclusion
In our theoretical analysis, we have found that (i) a
server will put more effort into his/her serve speed
when behind in score than when ahead in score, (ii)
players’ effort levels and thus serve speeds get less
sensitive to losses or gains when score difference gets
too large and (iii) overall servers will be more risk
averse in the domain of gains than in the domain of
losses. We have then used serve speed at different
points of matches in the high stakes, professional
Dubai Tennis Tournament to test our theoretical
predictions and whether overall players exhibited
the fundamental bias of loss aversion.
Many recent studies have questioned whether the
experimental results finding evidence of loss aver-
sion would decline as agents moved into higher
stakes or became more experienced. Similar to
Pope and Schweitzer (2011)’s results for male players
in golf, our results show that in the high stakes,
professionalized context of tennis too, experienced
professionals, especially male players, exhibit strong
behavioural biases. In other words, given that our
data comes from professional tennis, which is a very
different competitive endeavour than golf (due to
golf’s open play format versus tennis’ match play
format, as mentioned before), our results provide
evidence that their findings of loss aversion for
male golfers in high-stakes settings extend beyond
golf. Specifically, we find that professional male ten-
nis players, when behind in score, serve faster than
when they are ahead in score.
Furthermore, we control for a number of compet-
ing explanations that are consistent with loss averse
behaviour, and like Pope and Schweitzer (2011), we
find none can accurately explain why serve speed
falls as a player’s relative score improves. An advan-
tage of our data is that it allows us to test for whether
the genders differ in the degree to which they suffer
from this behavioural bias. We find that male players
are more risk seeking in the loss domain as they
increase serve speed when behind in set score while
female players are more risk averse in the gain
domain since they decrease serve speed when
ahead in set score. Hence, although we find evidence
for behaviour consistent with loss aversion for both
males and females, its manifestation differs signifi-
cantly between the two sexes.
Our empirical results also indicate that, while
male players have a higher serve speed and thus
exhibit more effort when behind in score than
when ahead in score compared with when the
score is even, falling far behind in the game score
lowers their serve speed and so does pulling far
ahead in the game score as well; thus, their serve
speeds get less sensitive to losses or gains when the
score difference gets too large. Further, due to loss
aversion, this latter relationship is not fully sym-
metric since a player serves harder when he is
behind than when he is ahead. These are fully in
line with our theoretical results and as predicted by
Prospect Theory overall (Kahneman and Tversky
1979). A female player, on the other hand, does
not change her serve speed and thus her effort
when behind compared with when the score is tied,
while she serves slower when ahead than when the
score is tied. Further, falling far behind in the point
score lowers serve speed for females and so does
7These results too are available upon request.
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pulling far ahead in the point score as well. These are
partially in line with our theoretical results and thus
with Prospect Theory. Thus, our results, which are
robust to controlling for player fixed effects as well
as controlling for player characteristics in a random-
effects specification, show that there are important
gender differences in the manifestation of loss aver-
sion in that overall male players exhibit more loss
aversion.
Like Pope and Schweitzer (2011), however, we
cannot say whether our findings extend to many
other different high-stake environments or not. Yet
demonstrating this in an alternative competitive set-
ting provides further evidence that agents do system-
atically suffer from loss aversion and reflection
effect. Our study further suggests that it affects
both genders, albeit differently.
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